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Abstract 
In this article the authors focus on two important innovations for agri-environmental measures 
in the new council regulation: The implementation of local action groups and a call for 
tenders. The article describes how relevant actors assess the innovations. The results are based 
on 276 interviews, carried out in 2006 in nine EU Member States. Generally, actors assume 
that measures designed in local action groups are not necessarily more economically efficient 
than current measures, but they do have potential to result in a higher ecological effectiveness 
and in a greater acceptance. However, the opinion on auctions is comparatively critical. 
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1 Introduction 
In September 2005, the Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 on support for rural development was 
agreed by the Council of the European Union.1 This regulation is the basis of the so called 
second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which focuses on three commonly 
agreed core policy objectives, named axes. The first axis targets at improving the 
competitiveness of agriculture and forestry, the second at supporting land management and 
improving the environment and the third at improving the quality of life and encouraging 
diversification of economic activities.  
In this article we concentrate on the agri-environmental measures (AEM) which are part of 
the second axis. The AEM have been introduced 1992 and remunerate farmers for activities 
which go beyond the usual Good Farming Practices. The new regulation contains two 
important innovations which are relevant for the following considerations: First, the three 
thematic axes are complemented by a fourth methodological axis dedicated to the LEADER 
approach. As at least 5 % of the funds has to be allocated to the LEADER axis, this allows 
Member States to design a part of the AEM in local action groups defined in Article 61 of the 
regulation (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). Second, in particular for AEM, the new 
regulation introduces auctions as an additional option for contracting farmers. Article 39 (4) 
says: “Where appropriate, the beneficiaries may be selected on the basis of calls for tender, 
applying criteria of economic and environmental efficiency” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). 
Based on the ongoing political and scientific discussion we first ask how relevant actors 
involved in the design and implementation process of AEM, assess the innovative parts of the 
regulation. In a next step we analyse which factors are influencing their evaluation. Finally we 
point out the main obstacles for the implementation of those bottom up approaches for 
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designing AEM. The empirical data presented in this article are based on the EU research 
project “Integrated Tools to Design and Implement Agro-Environmental Schemes” (ITAES). 
It is a specific targeted research project of the Sixth Framework Programme launched by the 
European Commission in 2003. In this project, in 2006 quantitative and qualitative data have 
been collected in ten case study areas over nine EU countries.  
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter two starts with summarizing the scientific and 
political discussion on local action groups, including environmental cooperatives, and 
auctions in the context of AEM, keeping in mind the detailed options for such innovative 
approaches offered in the new regulation. Chapter three briefly describes the methodology 
and the sample of countries and actors. The actors’ assessment of LAG and auctions are 
analyzed and discussed in chapter four. We end up with some conclusions and 
recommendations for policy makers. 
2 Scientific and political discussion on bottom up approaches for Agri-
Environmental measures 
The AEM have been criticized during the last years for several reasons. According to the 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2005), neither the objectives nor the effects of the measures 
are clear and transparent. Several authors argue the lack of effectiveness results from the fact 
that the present AEM neither consider local production potential and environmental 
conditions, nor local people’s interest and their specific problems sufficiently (BULLER 2000; 
LOWE and BALDOCK 2000). Concerning the compensation of costs for carrying out AEM, in 
several cases unspecific measures and payments cause overcompensation for farmers in 
marginal areas, where the uptake of AEM is comparatively high. On the other hand, in areas 
with high production potential due to high soil quality, however, the extensification payments 
usually do not fully compensate the economic loss due to comparatively high opportunity 
costs (OSTERBURG, 2002). Summarising several evaluations which have been done, the 
environmental effectiveness as well as the cost-effectiveness of AEM within the former 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2078/1992 and the Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 vary widely and 
are very often unsatisfying (MARGGRAF, 2003). As this was not in line with the original 
objectives of the Regulations, the European Commission argued that most Member States 
simply did not fully exploit the scopes and opportunities offered by the EU (FISCHLER, 2000). 
2.1 Prospects for local action groups  
In the new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 on support for rural development at least 
5 % of the budget, distributed on the three axes mentioned above, has to be spent on bottom 
approaches in local action groups (LAG). The LAG shall satisfy the following conditions: (a) 
they must propose an integrated local development strategy …; (b) they must consist of either 
a group already qualified for the Leader II or Leader+ initiatives, … or according to the 
Leader approach, or be a new group representing partners from the various locally based 
socioeconomic sectors in the territory concerned. At the decision making level, the economic 
and social partners, as well as other representatives of the civil society, such as farmers, rural 
women, young people and their associations, must make up at least 50 % of the local 
partnership; (c) they must show an ability to define and implement a development strategy for 
the area. Furthermore “the Managing Authority shall ensure that the local action groups either 
select an administrative and financial leading actor able to administer public funds and ensure 
the satisfactory operation of the partnership, or come together in a legally constituted common 
structure, the constitution of which guarantees the satisfactory operation of the partnership 
and the ability to administer public funds”. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005, article 62) 
To meet these requirements, local action groups might integrate more objectives than only the 
design of AEM. But with too many objectives, these groups run the risk of becoming too big. 
  369 
To solve the problem of the “too big groups” in article 62 (4) of the above mentioned 
regulation, it is said that local action groups may select cooperation projects. An agri-
environmental forum or an environmental cooperative could be part of a local action group 
with several specific subgroups. For a well functioning co-operation it is needed that members 
involve their commitment to specific goals, their willingness to endorse or transform existing 
routines and their responsiveness to incentives deliberately designed to maintain or improve 
their participation (MÉNARD 1995). POLMAN and SLANGEN (1999) underline in particular the 
relevance of reliable obligations and the stability of cooperative arrangements within the 
environmental sphere. In the Netherlands, environmental cooperatives for farmers already 
found a substantial spreading. The main ranges of activity of these environmental 
cooperatives lie in landscape conservation and in contractual nature protection, in 
environmental counselling for members and in the protection of their interests (SLANGEN 
1997). The members of the cooperatives maintain their private property rights and mainly 
remain independent farmers (SLANGEN 2001). Further conceptual thoughts on the design of 
environmental cooperatives are developed by HAGEDORN et al (2000, 2002). That local action 
groups can serve as an adequate solution for agri-environmental problems is shown by 
HAGEDORN (2001), ARZT et al (2003) and EGGERS et al (2004). From a different perspective 
the authors describe the implementation and working experiences with an Agri-
Environmental Forum in Brandenburg. The core argument of the authors is that more problem 
related measures with higher environmental effects could be designed. With the same amount 
of money spent on AEM a higher environmental effects could be achieved. KNICKEL et al 
(2006) describes the results of a comparative analysis of a sample of agriculture-environment 
projects of the Regional Action programme in Germany. 
Nevertheless, up to now bottom up approaches have been an exception during the last 
programme period. AHRENS et al (2000) assumed an unwillingness of regional politicians to 
demand considerable efforts from farmers to fulfil the objectives of the AEM. Research done 
in the field of political economy supports the view that agricultural lobbies maintain a strong 
influence on the design of agricultural policies in general and on AEM in particular 
(HAGEDORN, 1993; EGGERS, 2005, 2006). A differentiated analysis of the role of the regional 
administration has been carried out by EGGERS et al. (2004) for the case of the federal state 
Brandenburg. The authors concluded that “since decentral approaches beyond the Laender 
level are not explicitly provided by the relevant EU Regulations, there is no necessity for 
federal (or Laender) governments to support or implement any kind of local organisations, 
such as the Agri-Environmental Forum. On the contrary, the tight room for manoeuvre within 
the current Rural Development Regulation rather increase risks, workload and costs for the 
regional administration when trying to implement such local participatory approaches” 
(EGGERS et al, 2004: 27). EGGERS (2005) analysed several obstacles for implementing 
bottom-up approaches for AEM on the different administrative and institutional levels. 
According to this work, one reason is a lack of expert knowledge and time resources (both 
belong somehow together) within the administration on all political levels. In some cases a 
further cutback of regional administration might prevent the implementation of bottom up 
approaches which demand for a certain knowledge. But also the society is not sensitized for 
agri-environmental issues. This causes a reduced commitment of environmental associations 
because they might not be supported by its members for those activities. Another important 
issue is the risk aversion of the bureaucrats, stated by NISKANEN (1968) in his theory of 
bureaucracy. This couldn’t be disproved but somehow explained with the missing incentives 
for innovative approaches (EGGERS, 2005: 247). A core argument seems to be power and path 
dependency: Those actors which are in charge for the design of AEM at the moment, have nor 
any interests neither any relevant incentives for changing the current institutional 
arrangements (EGGERS, 2005: 225 ff). 
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2.2 Prospects for auctions  
As mentioned already in the introduction, in particular for AEM the new regulation allows a 
kind of auctions or calls for tender, applying criteria of economic and environmental 
efficiency (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005, article 39 (4)). Several countries are already 
applying auction mechanisms in order to guarantee natural resource management, for instance 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the United States, the Conservation Stewardship 
Scheme and the Nitrate Sensitive Areas Scheme in the United Kingdom. In Australia, the 
Bush Tender Trial is a well-know example of auctioning biodiversity contracts (STONEHAM et 
al. 2002). 
HOLM-MÜLLER et al. (2002: 119) highlight that auctions may be an adequate instrument for 
some AEM whereas for others not. HOLM-MÜLLER (2002) concludes that extensification 
programs offer the best conditions for successful auctions whereas it seems counterproductive 
to use auctions for choosing among different areas in environmental contracting. 
A research group from the Georg-August-University of Göttingen designed an outcome-based 
payment scheme to reward ecological services in agriculture on the basis of auctions. In 
addition, the project considers the interests of the local people and relevant stakeholders and 
their demand for botanical diversity. The authors conclude from their first experiences that 
such a payment scheme could be already practicable in a model region (GROTH, 2005). 
LATACZ-LOHMANN and VAN DER HAMSVOORT (1997) argue that competitive bidding, 
compared to fixed-rate payments, could increase the cost effectiveness of conservation 
contracting significantly. But the authors also mentioned the problem of strategic bidding 
behaviour in sequential auctions. HAILU and SCHILIZZI (2004: 149) concluded on bases of an 
agent-based computational experiment that the economic advantages of auctions might not 
survive over time as bidders learn to extract information rent. On the long run, auctions 
outcomes would be less attractive in comparison to fixed price schemes.  
CASON and GANGADHARAN (2004) conducted two laboratory experiments to investigate 
alternative auction mechanisms which could be useful for conservation and natural resource 
management. The first experiment was designed to analyse the relationship between an 
auction’s information structure and landowners’ incentives to reveal their costs (CASON and 
GANGADHARAN, 2004). The second experiment aimed at comparing discriminative price 
auctions with uniform price auctions in regard to their influence on landowners’ profits and 
environmental benefits (CASON and GANGADHARAN, 2004). Results from the experiments 
indicated that the design of auctions shows a strong impact on seller’s behaviour on the one 
hand and on market performance on the other. There is a strong indication that revealing the 
environmental benefits associated with land management options could cause a reduced 
market performance: landowners might raise their price offers with the effect that fewer 
projects can be realized with a fixed budget. Limited information thus appears to reduce 
strategic behaviour of the participants. The examination of the pricing rule brought to light a 
slightly better performance of the discriminative price auction in comparison to the uniform 
price auction.2 
Summarising this discussion, auctions are considered rather critical in the long run whereas 
local action groups seem to hold a serious potential to improve AEM, provided that they don’t 
become too big and that their members can identify themselves with the group. In the next 
section, the methodology used in this research will be elaborated together with a discussion of 
the main theoretical principles on which it is founded. 
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3 Methodology 
In 2006, an expert survey has been conducted in ten case study areas over nine EU countries, 
shown in table 1. The survey aimed at assessing decision-making and implementation 
procedures of AES from the viewpoint of different actors within public administrations, 
private associations, and research bodies. In a standardized questionnaire with five-point 
Likert scale variables actors have been asked for their perceptions and preferences. The 
questionnaire with six main parts included also open questions and room for additional 
comments which have been borne in mind in the discussion in chapter 4. In most countries 
members of the respective ITAES teams conducted face to face interviews supplemented by 
some telephone interviews. Only in Finland, in addition to the face to face interviews, a web 
based survey was carried out as actors were already used to this methodology. The data 
analysis includes descriptive analysis as well as ordered and simple logit regressions.  
In table 1 it is shown that in general the agricultural administration is represented most in the 
sample, followed by the environmental administration and farmers associations. 
Environmental associations and researchers are represented to a smaller extent. Because of the 
purpose to interview all actors from all administrative levels who is or could be involved in 
the design of AEM, representatives from hunting, tourism, consumer or any other associations 
were also questioned. However, the number of respondents in these groups is too small to 
conduct reliable statistical tests. Therefore, all groups with less than ten members are 
summarized in a group ‘Others’.  
Table 1. Number of respondents per type of organization by country  
Region/Type AgAd EnAd FaAs EnAs Res Other Total 
Flanders (BE) 7 11 3 4 2 3 30 
Czech Republic (CZ) 12 8 5 5 3 3 36 
Finland (FI) 22 6 14 3 2 0 47 
Basse-Normandie (FR) 18 8 10 1 3 1 41 
Brandenburg (DE) 7 10 4 5 5 7 38 
Ireland (IE) 1 0 1 2 3 2 9 
Veneto & Emilia Romag (IT) 8 3 9 2 5 3 30 
Friesland (NL) 4 2 2 2 7 2 19 
North England (UK) 6 7 2 9 2 3 29 
        
Total 85 55 50 33 32 24 279 
Legend:  AgAd: Agricultural Administration EnAd: Environmental Administration 
  FaAs: Farmer Association   EnAs: Environnemental Association   
  Res: Research  
Source: EGGERS et al. (2007: 41) 
Although it was originally planned to have about the same distribution of respondents over 
the different categories in all countries, this seemed to be practically impossible. However, the 
result reflects somehow the structure of relevant and interested actors in the field of AEM in 
each country. Nevertheless for the interpretation of the results for two countries critical 
remarks have to be made: First, the Netherlands’ sample is dominated by researchers, and 
second Ireland presents with only nine interviews a rather small number for statistical 
calculations. It was nevertheless decided to keep those countries in the sample because they 
do provide some useful information. 
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4 Local action groups and auctions as institutional innovations 
4.1 Assessing local action groups 
Generally, in our study we noticed a strong demand for decentralisation. First, we wanted to 
find out whether local action groups could be a valuable institutional alternative to the current 
system. Therefore a question was formulated as follows: “Local action groups, as mentioned 
in the new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005, could lead to a) a higher economic 
efficiency of AES; b) a higher environmental effectiveness and c) a greater acceptance of 
AES”. Actors could answer on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) or they 
could answer with “no opinion”.  For this question 85 % of the actors had an opinion.  
Figure 1. Assessment of local actions groups by actor groups 
 
Legend:  1: strongly disagree  2: disagree    3: indifferent    
  4: agree    5: strongly agree 
Source: EGGERS et al. (2007: 151) 
Figure 1 shows that two main groups exist concerning the assessment of the potential of LAG. 
Actors from the environmental administration and associations as well as researchers and the 
group “others”3 see a high potential in LAG. Contrary to these groups, actors from the 
agricultural administration and farmer associations tend to be indifferent or to disagree that 
LAG increase economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness and acceptance. On average, 
actors are indifferent concerning a higher economic efficiency of local action groups (3.0). 
There is a slightly higher level of agreement with the statements that LAG result in a higher 
environmental efficiency (3.4) and a higher acceptance of AEM (3.5). 
To assess which factors influence the opinion of the respondents on LAG ordered logistic 
regression models have been used, depicted in table 2. For LAG, the influence was assessed 
of the administrative levels, the countries, the actor groups and the opinion on the 
heterogeneity of the natural environment on the degree to which the respondents agree with 
the above mentioned statements. The latter variable is included because it is argued in the 
literature that LAG and auctions are in particular beneficial if the natural environment is 
heterogeneous. All variables in the models are dummies derived from categorical variables, 
                                                 
3  The category ‘others’ groups representatives from consumer organisations, hunting associations, tourism 
associations and LEADER groups. 
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except for the opinion on the heterogeneity of the natural environment4 which is a ordinal 
variable. The consequence of using dummy variables is that one can only assess the influence 
of a dummy compared to a reference category.  
Table 2. Ordered logistic regression models for local action groups 
Variables Higher economic 
efficiency of AEM 
Higher ecological 
effectiveness of AEM 
Greater acceptance of 
AEM 
 Coefficient p for z test 
statistic 
Coefficient p for z test 
statistic 
Coefficient p for z test 
statistic 
NUTS1 
NUTS2 
NUTS3 
LAU 
 
BE 
IE 
FR 
DE 
UK 
IT 
NL 
FI 
 
Agr. Adm. 
Env. Adm. 
Agr. Assoc. 
Env. Assoc. 
 
Heterogeneity 
natural 
environment 
0.114 
0.339  
0.142  
1.190*  
  
1.918***   
0.515  
1.602 *** 
0.274  
0.033  
0.400  
2.243***  
-0.718  
 
-1.428 *** 
0.519  
-0.765* 
0.353  
 
-0.061  
 
0.833 
0.531 
0.771 
0.056 
 
0.002 
0.568 
0.003 
0.663 
0.961 
0.501 
0.000 
0.234 
 
0.001 
0.236 
0.082 
0.491 
 
0.635 
-0.306 
-0.007 
-0.210 
0.817 
 
1.861*** 
1.223 
2.814*** 
0.325 
0.708 
-0.145 
2.522*** 
-0.404 
 
-1.285*** 
-0.189 
-1.191*** 
-0.213 
 
0.130 
0.573 
0.989 
0.668 
0.183 
 
0.003 
0.184 
0.000 
0.611 
0.284 
0.816 
0.000 
0.505 
 
0.002 
0.671 
0.008 
0.671 
 
0.329 
-0.128 
-0.491 
0.3089 
0.273 
 
1.411** 
1.727* 
2.497*** 
0.127 
0.283 
0.767 
2.146*** 
-0.961 
 
-1.512*** 
-0.333 
-1.915*** 
-0.906* 
 
0.194 
0.819 
0.372 
0.545 
0.654 
 
0.026 
0.067 
0.000 
0.844 
0.681 
0.228 
0.000 
0.119 
 
0.000 
0.438 
0.000 
0.073 
 
0.144 
Nr. Obs. 
LR Chi² 
Prob. > Chi² 
Pseudo R² 
221 
103.730 
0.000 
0.149 
 231 
109.380 
0.000 
0.153 
 237 
107.680 
0.000 
0.149 
 
***: significant on the 0.01 level **: significant on the 0.05 level *: not significant with p< 0.1  
Source: Own calculations 
Table 2 shows that the administrative level only influences the assessment of the first 
statement: compared to the national level (NUTS0) as reference category, respondents from 
the Local Area Unit level (LAU level) agree more that LAG lead to a higher economic 
efficiency of AEM5. The assessment of all three statements is significantly influenced by the 
country: compared to the Czech Republic as reference country, LAG are more positively 
evaluated in Flanders, Basse-Normandie and Fryslân concerning economic efficiency, 
                                                 
4  Actors have been asked to what extent they consider the natural environment within their region spatially 
heterogeneous. They could answer from 1 (very homogenous) to 5 (very heterogeneous). 
5  If for a certain variable, the p-value belonging to the z test statistic is lower than 0.05, we assume that the 
coefficient in the model belonging to that variable is significantly different from zero. 
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ecological effectiveness and acceptance6. There is no significant difference in assessment 
between the Czech Republic and the other countries, although in the last model Ireland also 
agrees considerably more that LAG result in a greater acceptance of AEM. Regarding the 
influence of the actor groups, the models show that, compared to the reference category 
consisting of researchers and others, the agricultural administration and agricultural 
associations significantly assess LAG more negatively concerning economic efficiency, 
ecological effectiveness and acceptance of AEM.  
However not significant on the 0.05 level, environmental associations evaluate the influence 
of LAG on acceptance of AEM also more negatively than researchers. Although we 
hypothesized that LAG would be evaluated more positively when the natural environment is 
perceived to be more heterogeneous, the models don’t show a significant influence of this 
variable on the assessment of all three statements. For the three models, the MacFadden’s 
Pseudo R² indicates that the models can only explain the variance in the dependent variables 
to a limited extent7.  
In the survey, the respondents had the possibility to comment more elaborately on the issue of 
LAG in an open question. Summarizing this qualitative information, in general there seems to 
be a positive attitude towards organizing AEM through LAG. Although LAG are expected to 
be more costly, because they are administratively more intensive, they lead to higher benefits 
because of a higher knowledge of LAG on the local situation. In Belgium, the respondents 
call for more pilot projects and an increased involvement of regional farm planners in LAG. 
4.2 Assessing Auctions 
On average calls for tenders or auctions tended not to be considered as an institutional 
alternative for AEM among the respondents. This may be influenced by the fact that auctions 
are less well known in comparison to LAG. Only 75 % of the respondents had an opinion on 
auctions (85% for LAG). On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) actors 
don’t agree that auctions lead to less transaction costs (2.4). They are indifferent concerning 
the second and the third statement, which states that auctions lead to a greater acceptance 
(2.7) and higher environmental effectiveness (2.6). When comparing the evaluation of 
auctions by actor groups we notice a similar pattern as we have seen for LAG, only on a 
lower level. The agricultural domain assesses auctions rather critical whereas the other actor 
groups tend be indifferent. The same explaining variables as for LAG have been used in three 
models on the opinion of respondents regarding the above mentioned statements for auctions. 
The calculations have shown that the administrative level has an influence on the assessment 
of the first and the third statement. Compared to the national level as reference category, the 
NUTS 2 level agrees significantly more that auctions result in savings in transaction costs and 
the LAU level agrees more that auctions result in a greater acceptance of AEM. The influence 
of the country is different for the three statements. Compared to the reference country Czech 
Republic, Basse-Normandie and to a lesser extent Fryslân agree more that auctions lead to 
savings in transaction costs in the implementation of AEM. Finland agrees considerably less 
than the reference country Czech Republic that auctions lead to higher environmental 
outcomes of AEM. Flanders, and to a lesser extent Fryslân, agree more than the reference 
country that auctions lead to a greater acceptance of AEM. The influence of the actor groups 
is the same as for LAG: the agricultural domain -administration and associations- assess 
auctions significantly more negative than the reference group of researchers concerning 
                                                 
6  The dummy variables are depicted in the model with the official country code, although for most countries 
they only represent a region. BE therefore is Flanders, IE Ireland, FR Basse-Normandie, DE Brandenburg, UK 
North England, IT Emilia Romagna and Veneto, NL Fryslân and FI is Finland. 
7  If the p-value belonging to the Likelihood Ratio Chi² test statistic is lower than 0.05, which is the case for the 
three models, it means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero. 
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economic efficiency, ecological effectiveness and acceptance. Again, despite our hypothesis 
that a greater heterogeneity of the natural environment results in a more positive opinion on 
bottom-up approaches, according to the models the assessment of auctions is not influenced 
significantly by this variable. The MacFadden’s Pseudo R² indicates again that the models can 
only explain the variance in the dependent variables to a limited extent.  
Regarding the qualitative information on auctions, obtained from the open questions in the 
survey, the general assessment is not that positive as with LAG. Respondents from the Czech 
Republic are generally positive about auctions, but believe the approach is better suited to 
large farms and can increase the chance of corruption. In Brandenburg, the larger input of 
farmers in a call for tender approach is valued, but there is also the fear that farmers lack 
sufficient knowledge. Respondents from Brandenburg and from Emilia Romagna, Italy, fear 
that in the long run, auctions will prove to be administratively time-consuming and thus too 
costly. Respondents from Flanders praise the better adaptation to local conditions following 
from the call for tender approach. 
In Basse-Normandie, respondents fear that this approach will lead to an unequal treatment of 
farmers, and that there will be a too large emphasis on financial issues instead of 
environmental ones. On average calls for tenders or auctions as an institutional alternative for 
AEM tended not to be considered among the respondents as leading to less transaction costs, 
greater acceptance and higher environmental effectiveness. The disagreement to the latter 
was, however, less marked compared to the transaction costs reduction. In comparison to 
LAG actors are much more sceptical concerning the implementation of auctions. 
5 Conclusions  
Summarizing the results of the 276 interviews in nine countries, actors assume that measures 
designed in local action groups (LAG) are not necessarily more efficient than current 
measures. But actors attribute the potential of a higher ecological effectiveness and higher 
acceptance to measures which are designed in a LAG. Contrary to LAG the opinion on 
auctions is comparatively critical. This may be influenced by the fact that auctions are less 
well known for most of the actors.   
Generally, the assessment of LAG and auctions is very much groups specific. Actors from 
environmental administration and association as well as researches and other see a high 
potential in LAG and are indifferent to critical concerning the implementation of auctions. 
Conversely, actors from the agricultural administration and farmer associations tend to be 
indifferent or disagree, that LAG increase economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness 
and acceptance and assess the potential of auctions as negative. LAG and auctions are 
evaluated more positively by the lower administrative levels and by regions like Flanders, 
Fryslân and Basse-Normandie. Lower administrative levels may expect more influence due to 
the institutional innovations. The positive attitude of Basse-Normandie and especially Fryslân 
can be explained by the fact that they already have more experience with bottom-up 
approaches. For most countries it can be concluded that as long as agricultural administration 
and farmers associations are by far the most influencing groups on the design process of 
AEM, bottom up approaches, which are claimed in the new regulation, will remain an 
exception. Furthermore actors fear the effort which might be connected with the control of the 
work of LAG.  
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